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The book comprises the proceedings of a conference held at Canberra in November 1993. According 
to the blurb it is a "landmark publication ... the first to analyse Australia's intelligence requirements and 
options in the post-Cold War era." Indeed some of the pieces sparkle; many are earnest. Unlikely facts 
emerge: Bank of China officials are suspected of misappropriating 28 billion dollars; the Abu Nidal 
Organization was among the creditors of the fraudulent Bank of Credit and Commerce International. 
Deficiencies, however, include the fact that the conference defined its aim too broadly. Every agency 
from the Customs service and Coastwatch up claim a national intelligence or security role, but the national 
intelligence authority, the Office of National Assessment (ONA), did not attend and neither did the collectors. 
So bids emerge, but no unity of theme or agreement as to the proper character and function of intelligence. 
This lack of focus contrasts with that of the 1994 CASIS (Canadian Association for Security and 
Intelligence Studies) conference on national intelligence assessment. 
More egregious still is special pleading: academics wanting access to intelligence secrets, with 
presumed wisdom being their credentials; others were frankly keen to gain access to the public trough. 
Deep self-interest informed a plea for "greater openness," cast in terms of high principle, by a journalist 
whose specialty is low intelligence leaks. 
Because the papers vary so much in subject matter and quality, selective reading according to taste and 
interest is recommended. That said, the must read for its perspicacity and analytical grip is John Ferris’ 
global perspective on intelligence after the Cold War. Here this reviewer has only two points of 
disagreement to register. The first is that Ferris" judgment that "the shape of intelligence services is always 
dictated by the policies and perceptions of their masters" understates the force of bureaucratic inertia. 
Second, he has buried the KGB prematurely. These points aside, Ferris' global view from Calgary contrasts 
with the provincial character of many, though not all the Australian contributions. 
Gary Waters provides a gripping read on the Gulf War, a distant event in which Australia had large 
interests, although its forces played a small part. His essay is a reminder that preventing wars, and failing 
that, winning them, remains the most potent function of intelligence. And Brendon Hammer demonstrates, 
with impressive economy and clarity, intelligence's future in underpinning non-proliferation regimes. 
Peter Polomka takes the prize for novel judgments, advocating pre-emptive capitulation by Australia 
and its neighbours in response to China's growing military power. And he revisits the argument that 
Norman Angell canvassed ca. 1913 that economic interdependence will rule out war between the great 
powers, thus failing to note how nuclear weapons have kept the peace. 
Also novel is Alan Wrigley's dismissal of the utility of intelligence for defence. This is surprising, 
given that he is a former senior Defence official, designer of a notable military aircraft and sometime 
Director-General of ASIO, Australia's security service. Paul Dibb sets him right on the importance of 
superior intelligence collection capability to Australia's defence posture. Wrigley presents ONA as an 
American mouthpiece in national intelligence debates during the 1980s about the cogency of the Soviet threat 
to Australia's security, as if ONA were incapable of itself judging the evidence. Whether he does so from 
ignorance or spleen is hard to say. 
Another contributor's judgment that US intelligence analysis on the Soviet Union failed — as if the 
USSR would have crashed without immense external pressure — also exemplifies the wrongheaded thinking 
that remoteness breeds. Both views downplay the importance of the Soviet threat to Australia's security. This 
position is strangely at odds with the conference's assumption that the end of the Cold War transformed 
international security, and with the intensity of KGB interest in ASIO at which Oleg Kalugin’s published 
remarks hint. 
As a consumer, Kevin Rogers writes succinctly about the utility of intelligence support for counter-
terrorism. But his concept of shared responsibility for outcomes between producers and consumers would 
blur dangerously the critical divide between intelligence and policy. Robin Miller writes thoughtfully about 
the parliamentary oversight of intelligence, but may underestimate the risks in Australia of thereby 
politicizing intelligence. 
Paul Barratt explains persuasively how commercial intelligence could help business. However, he 
doesn't investigate the difficulties of exploiting for private sector gain intelligence collected for national 
security purposes. Greg Austin's well intended suggestion that the Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security monitor analytic performance in economic intelligence has a totalitarian character. 
Hugh Smith's discussion of the United Nation's intelligence needs for peace keeping/enforcement 
operations underlines the fact that the UN is not a government driven by national purposes. Australia's 
advocacy of maritime confidence-building measures in the Western Pacific gives too much weight to 
misunderstanding as the cause of conflict as opposed to clashes of interest. Sam Bateman acknowledges that 
intelligence is unlikely to prove rewarding in this area. 
In conclusion, Major General Hartley points out that CNN hasn't made intelligence redundant; and 
that academics aren't bound to make good intelligence analysts — experience is mixed. But his advocacy of 
quality management and client orientation is nothing more than managerialist jargon for the intelligence 
tradition of meeting customer requirements. 
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